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ONE DOLLAR PER DAY:  A NOTE ON RECENT 
FORCED LABOR AND DOLLAR-PER-DAY 
WAGES IN PRIVATE PRISONS HOLDING 
PEOPLE UNDER IMMIGRATION LAW† 
Jacqueline Stevens 
ABSTRACT  
In 2015, nine plaintiffs in Denver, Colorado filed a lawsuit in federal court 
against The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”), alleging that the work they performed 
for GEO, while detained under immigration laws, violated Colorado’s Minimum-
Wage Order (CMWO), the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) 
prohibition against forced labor, and Colorado common law barring unjust 
enrichment. In the wake of the federal district court allowing two out of the three 
charges to be heard by juries, as well as granting class certification, additional 
lawsuits against GEO and the prison firm CoreCivic were filed in California and 
Washington. 
To assist scholars and practitioners in staying abreast of novel and fast-
emerging developments, this Article provides key excerpts and analysis from 
recent filings in five cases: Menocal v. The GEO Group (2015), Owino v. 
CoreCivic (2017), State of Washington v. The GEO Group (2017), Chao 
Chen v. The GEO Group (2017), and Novoa v. The GEO Group (2017). 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As prisons supplanted corporal punishment in England and the 
colonies in the sixteenth century, the forced labor of those punished by 
incarceration was justified by a variety of political, economic, and 
religious or other supposedly moral rationales.1  Emerging in a legal space 
                                                
* Professor, Department of Political Science, Director, Deportation Research Clinic, 
Buffett Institute for Global Justice, Northwestern University 
†  Thanks to Haley Hopkins for her research assistance, as well as to Charles Clarke for 
manuscript preparation.  Thanks also to attorney Andrew Free for representing me in 
ongoing litigation under the Freedom of Information Act to compel the federal government 
to release documents controlled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on the 
management of private prisons.  To follow updated motions in litigation discussed in this 
Article, see http://deportationresearchclinic.org/DRC-INS-ICE-FacilityContracts-Reports. 
html [https://perma.cc/Z4JW-CX29]. 
1 See Ryan Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case against State 
Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 213, 217 n.36 (2009) (“[c]onsidered a 
major reform in punishment at the time, the Walnut Street Prison required its inmates to 
work ‘in order to attack idleness, though to be a major cause of crime’”) (citing Stephen 
Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 348 (1998) and quoting William 
Quigley, Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justice Demands Decent Work for 
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2004) (“[t]he focus 
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specifically designated as distinct from penal institutions, the labor of 
those in custody under immigration laws also has received attention since 
its inception.2  Indeed the Supreme Court’s famous 1896 decision 
prohibiting punitive measures based on civil immigration laws responded 
in particular to an 1892 statute requiring that any person of Chinese origin 
or descent found illegally in the United States “be imprisoned at hard 
labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from 
the United States.”3  The Court found the requirement of hard labor 
“inflicts an infamous punishment” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.4  In the decades following the ruling, Congress and the 
agencies overseeing the housing of people under immigration laws were 
mindful of this prohibition and ensured that no one in custody under 
immigration laws would be forced to work.5 
Having attempted to distinguish certain consequences of detention 
under immigration law from criminal custody, Congress continued to 
pass legislation providing few legal protections to those in deportation 
proceedings.6  In the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act, which 
remains the basis for much of the current U.S. Code governing detention 
authority under immigration laws, Congress specified that the 
Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) had authority to detain people 
under immigration laws without using hearings specified by the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946.7  This portion of the statute 
was written to respond to a 1950 Supreme Court opinion affirming a 
habeas petition based on the absence of due process in deportation 
                                                
was primarily on the moral rehabilitation of the prisoner and only secondarily on the idea of 
having prison work defray some of the costs of incarceration”)). 
2 See infra Part II (showing the legal growth around and examination of immigration laws 
about detained immigrants and using said individuals for labor). 
3 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 976 (1896). 
4 Id. 
5 See Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immigration Jail, from 
1943 to Present, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 398 (2015) (examining the history and actions of using 
immigrants for work while they are being held for the benefits of government purposes, and 
using plain text statutory construction to argue that those in custody under immigration laws 
meet the definition of “employees” in federal law entitled to the protections of worker wage 
and safety laws).  See also S.H. Garfinkel, The Voluntary Work Program: Expanding Labor Laws 
to Protect Detained Immigrant Workers, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1287, 1291–92 (2017) (analyzing 
the voluntary work program for those detained under immigration laws); Anita Sinha, 
Slavery by Another Name: “Voluntary” Immigrant Detainee Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 1 (2015) (depicting how the work programs in immigration 
detention facilities violate constitutional rights). 
6 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414 (presenting 
legislation about immigration law and how immigrants are held in criminal custody). 
7 See id. (discussing the detaining of immigrants without hearings when they are taken 
into custody by the government). 
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proceedings.8  Wong Yang Sung held that the recently passed APA had as 
its purpose to “curtail and change practices of embodying in one person 
or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge” and found that the APA, 
indeed applied to the deportation proceedings of the U.S. Immigration 
Service.9  The Court concluded by granting the writ of habeas corpus and 
releasing the prisoner, because the deportation proceedings did not 
conform to the requirements of the APA.10 
In Marcello, six members of the Court, in a brief paragraph, found that 
the immigration hearing procedures exemplified due process because 
many decisions were reviewable in Article III courts and noted the 
“special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may 
take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in 
immigration matters.”11 
The current litigation on behalf of respondents in ICE custody, who 
are forced to work for one to three dollars per day or to avoid solitary 
confinement or other punishment, occurs in the policy context of these 
earlier laws, but in an operational context that is vastly different.12  The 
purpose of this Article is to apprise interested students, scholars, and 
practitioners of the most recent court filings from litigation challenging 
the work policies of private prisons owned and operated by The GEO 
Group and CoreCivic (previously “Corrections Corporation of America” 
and hereinafter CCA) in Colorado, California, and Washington State.13 
                                                
8 See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 445, 455 (1950) (sustaining the writ of habeas 
corpus based on the absence of due process in deportation proceedings). 
9 Id. at 445, 454. 
10 See id. at 455; Marcello v. Bonds, Officer in Charge, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service 349 U.S. 302, 308–09 (1955) (finding that the plain text and legislative history of 
section 242(b) of the INA established that Congress intended to exclude deportation hearings 
from the APA requirements and instead create “a specialized administrative procedure 
applicable to deportation hearings”). 
11 Id. at 311. 
12 See Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) & Appointment 
of Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 2, Menocal v. GEO Corp., No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D. 
Colo. Feb. 2, 2017) (describing the current litigation in Menocal v. GEO Corp). 
13 See id. at 2, 8.  See also Complaint with Jury Demand at 4, Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 
3:17-cv-1112-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2017) (alleging CoreCivic unlawfully forced 
detainees to operate their detention facilities); Complaint at 1–2, Washington v. GEO Corp., 
No. 17-2-11422-2 (Super. Ct. Wash. Sept. 20, 2017) (challenging GEO Corp.’s disregard of 
Washington’s minimum wage laws); Class Action Complaint for Damages at 2, Chao Chen 
v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2017) (asserting that GEO violated 
Washington’s minimum wage laws by only paying detainees one dollar per day). 
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II.  CASES 
Key excerpts from motions and orders are offered to provide a brief 
and specific review of the competing arguments, with examples chosen 
from selected briefs to avoid duplication of arguments and precedents 
cited.  All of these cases are at the pleading stage, though discovery has 
begun in Menocal.14 
A. Alejandro Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., case no. 1:14-cv-02887, U.S. 
District Court, Colorado. Filed 10/22/2014. 
1. Class Action Complaint For Unpaid Wages and Forced Labor, 
Document 1, Filed 10/22/2014 
The Class Action Complaint against The GEO Group, Inc., a private 
prison firm,15 sought to compel the private prison to pay compensatory 
and punitive damages for unpaid wages and forced labor at its Aurora, 
Colorado facility.16  The motion asserted that the facts common to the 
plaintiffs arose from their shared status as employees of GEO in whose 
Aurora facility they scraped and scrubbed toilets, bathrooms, showers, 
windows, medical facilities, patient rooms, and medical offices.17  They 
also washed laundry for ICE residents, served meals, cut hair, prepared 
clothes for those arriving, prepared meals for law enforcement officials at 
GEO-sponsored events, completed office work for GEO, managed the law 
library, cleaned the solitary confinement and intake areas, deep-cleaned 
and readied empty areas of the facility for incoming detainees, cleaned the 
warehouse, maintained the facility’s exterior, and landscaped the 
surrounding grounds.18 
Plaintiffs alleged that GEO’s practices constituted three violations of 
Colorado or federal law.  First, plaintiffs argued that GEO violated the 
Colorado Minimum Wage Order (CMWO), which requires employers pay 
their employees at an hourly rate equal to or greater than the statutory 
minimum wage.19  Second, the Complaint highlighted GEO’s practice of 
compelling six randomly-selected detainees from each pod to clean their 
                                                
14 See Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (certifying the detainees as a class against GEO). 
15 See GEO Group, Inc. Form 10–Q Filing, (June 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/923796/000119312517249967/d423976d10q.htm [https://perma.cc/ZYV8-
A3Q9] (showing that GEO Group, Inc. is a private company that runs prisons). 
16 See Class Action Complaint for Unpaid Wages and Forced Labor at 4,  Menocal v. GEO 
Grp., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2014) (requesting damages and restitution for 
GEO’s unlawful employment of detainees for no pay or the nominal amount of one dollar). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 2–3. 
19 Id. at 3. 
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pod each day in violation of the federal prohibition against forced labor 
under the TVPA.20  Third, plaintiffs claimed that GEO’s dollar-per-day 
pay policies “violate principles of justice, equity, and good conscience” 
thereby transgressing the Colorado common-law doctrine barring unjust 
enrichment.21  Judge John L. Kane denied GEO’s motion to dismiss the 
federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) claim and the common-
law unjust enrichment claim, although he affirmed the motion to dismiss 
the CMWO claim.22 
III.  CMWO 
Judge Kane’s order denying GEO’s motion to dismiss cites the 
CMWO’s definition of an “employee” as any “person performing labor or 
services for the benefit of an employer in which the employer may 
command when, where, and how much labor or services shall be 
performed.”23  But Judge Kane also acknowledged GEO’s claims that 
“prisoners” should not count as “employees” for purposes of analysis 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) nor, by analogy, should 
anyone working in government custody be treated as an “employee” 
under the CMWO.24  The order continues: 
Defendants also cite a March 31, 2012 Advisory Bulletin 
from the Colorado Department of Labor (CDOL), which 
finds that inmates and prisoners are exempt from the 
CMWO and ‘are not employees according to Colorado 
law.’ Plaintiffs respond that the Advisory Bulletin does 
not apply because plaintiffs are civil immigration 
detainees in a private detention facility, and not prisoners 
in government custody. Defendant also argues that the 
reasoning applied in Alvarado to conclude that prisoners 
are not employees under the FLSA applies here because 
immigration detainees are housed by the government 
and do not require the minimum wage to bring up their 
standard of living.25 
Judge Kane also indicated that the CDOL: 
                                                
20 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589). 
21 Id. 
22 See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 14, Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc., 320 F.R.D. 
258 (D. Colo. 2014) [hereinafter Order Denying Motion to Dismiss] (stating that the judge 
granted in part and denied in part GEO’s motion to dismiss). 
23 Id. (citing 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 103-1:2 (2017)). 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Id. 
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[h]as found that the CMWO’s definition of ‘employee’ 
should not apply to prisoners. In addition, because 
immigration detainees, like prisoners, do not use their 
wages to provide for themselves, the purpose of the 
CMWO are not served by including them in the definition 
of employee. [] Finally, the Fifth Circuit has held that 
immigration detainees are not employees under the 
FLSA’s similar broad definition (‘any individual 
employed by an employer’) because the congressional 
motive for enacting the FLSA, like the CMWO, was to 
protect the ‘standard of living’ and ‘general well-being’ of 
the worker in American industry.”26 
The order finds that the CMWO applies to all businesses offering 
services to the public, but also notes that the CMWO does not apply to 
state hospitals, according to CDOL Advisory Bulletin 24(I), adding that 
the Aurora detention center’s medical facility was more similar to a state-
run hospital than a private business offering healthcare services to the 
public at large.27  Judge Kane also observed that the CMWO applies to 
“Retail and Service” employers and consumers, and that the 
GEO/government relation does not fit this definition.28 
IV.  TVPA 
Judge Kane’s order recognized that the TVPA provides a civil cause 
of action against anyone who “knowingly provides or obtains the labor or 
services of a person by . . . means of force, threats of force, physical 
restraint, or threats of physical restraint.”29  The order highlighted the 
defendants’ reliance on the holding in United States v. Kozminski, which 
interprets the TVPA to prohibit only “physical or legal, as opposed to 
psychological, coercion.”30  The court also rejected the inferences the 
defendants drew from Channer v. Hall, a decision, which the court 
understood to hold that threats of solitary confinement used to compel an 
                                                
26 Id. at 3–4 (citing Alvarado, 902 F. 2d at 396 (internal citation omitted)). 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 See id. at 5–6 (explaining that CMWO covers retail and services employees and that the 
plaintiffs do not qualify as either). 
29 Id. at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2016)). 
30 See Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (D. Colo. 2015).  See also 
United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (1988) (a family running dairy farm was not 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584 when it procured work by making threats of two cognitively 
disabled men and discouraged them from leaving because the “reach [of 18 U.S.C. § 1584] 
should be limited to cases involving the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use 
of physical or legal coercion”). 
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immigration detainee to perform kitchen work does not constitute a 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary 
servitude.31  Judge Kane distinguished the language of “involuntary 
servitude” at issue in Kozminski and Channer (originating in the TVPA at 
18 USC § 1584 and in the Thirteenth Amendment, respectively) from the 
more inclusive language of § 1589, which refers to “whoever . . . obtains 
the labor or services of a person by . . . threats of physical restraint.”32  The 
order found that the language of § 1589 is intentionally broader than the 
passages interpreted in Kozminski and Channer.  The order also noted that 
GEO failed to cite any authority supporting their claim that a “civic duty 
exception” should be read into the language of § 1589, nor that this 
exception should be applied to a for-profit prison company doing contract 
work for the government.33 
V.  UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The court noted that the elements of the unjust enrichment claim track 
those of the claim under the CMWO, which was dismissed.34  Nonetheless, 
the order found that the plaintiffs’ claim under the CMWO was distinct 
from their common-law unjust enrichment claim.35  The remedies sought 
under the two legal theories were different, even though both claims 
alleged that GEO failed to pay fair-market wages.36  “Unjust enrichment” 
includes profits from practices that may not violate the CMWO but are 
nonetheless illegal under Colorado common law.37 
The basis for the potentially higher unjust enrichment claims is the 
Service Contract Act (SCA), which obligates firms performing work under 
contract with the federal government to pay “prevailing wages” for 
                                                
31 See Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.  See also Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 
1997) (holding “that the federal government is entitled to require a communal contribution 
by an INS detainee in the form of housekeeping tasks, and that Channer's kitchen service, 
for which he was paid, did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of 
involuntary servitude”). 
32 See Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1133. 
33 Id. at 1132–33. 
34 See id. at 1133 (explaining that the unjust enrichment claim is based on the CMWO claim 
and thus a legal remedy is available to the plaintiffs). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. (“proper measure of unjust enrichment is difference between consideration paid 
and fair market value of employee's services” (citing Growth Fund Sponsors, Inc., 904 P.2d 
1381, 1387 (Colo. App. 1995))). See also Edwards v. ZeniMax Media Inc. No. 12-cv-00411, 2013 
WL 5420933, *10 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2013) (“denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment 
claim as duplicative where remedies sought were different”). 
Stevens: One Dollar Per Day: A Note on Recent Forced Labor and Dollar-Per-
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
350 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
specified occupations.38  All of these are at levels considerably higher than 
the minimum wage.39  GEO claimed that undocumented immigrants are 
not eligible for protections under the SCA.40  The judge’s order, however, 
affirmed the plaintiffs’ claim that the SCA mandates the contractor (or 
subcontractor) to provide fringe benefits beyond those mandated by the 
state or federal minimum wage laws.41 
The order rejected GEO’s claim that the plaintiffs’ suit must be thrown 
out under the “government contractor defense,” since, GEO asserted, the 
dollar-per-day voluntary detainee work program was established at the 
behest of the federal government.42  The court dismissed these arguments, 
and found that the contract between GEO and the federal government 
only establishes guidelines for reimbursement under the Detainee Work 
Program, and indeed: 
does not prohibit Defendant from paying detainees in 
excess of $1/day in order to comply with Colorado labor 
laws. In fact, the contract specifically contemplates that 
the Defendant will perform under the contract in 
accordance with ‘[a]pplicable federal, state and local 
labor laws and codes’; and the contract is subject to the 
SCA . . . .43 
Based on this logic, Judge Kane rejected GEO’s attempts to skirt their legal 
duties under the labor laws in force in Colorado.44 
A. Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider 
Less than a month after Judge Kane issued an order refusing to 
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against GEO under the TVPA and Colorado 
common law, GEO’s attorneys made the unusual move of asking the court 
                                                
38 See Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (conveying the applicability of the SCA to 
contracts). 
39 See id. at 1134 (describing the added provisions that give contracted employees wage 
security). 
40 See id. (explaining that the defendants utilized the contractor’s defense against the 
plaintiff). 
41 See id. (relying and state and federal minimum wage laws). See also American Waste 
Removal Co. v. Donovan, 748 F.2d 1406, 1410 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the SCA “is also 
intended to protect service contract competitors from unfair competition by employers 
paying subminimum wages”). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1135. 
44 Id. 
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to reconsider its judgment.45  The defendant’s motion asserted that GEO 
“does not ‘traffic’ anyone,” and admonished Judge Kane for his 
interpretation of the TVPA, which defendants claimed “should be rejected 
as ‘absurd,’ as that term is understood under well-established rules of 
statutory construction.”46  The defendant criticized the judge for not 
satisfactorily explaining why Congress might have intended the 
protections of the TVPA to extend to victims of forced labor working for 
private contractors of the U.S. government.47  The defendant’s motion 
acknowledged Judge Kane’s reliance on the plain language of the TVPA, 
which does not refer to any exceptions to its prohibition against forced 
labor, although GEO argued that the court erred by hewing so closely to 
the plain text of the act instead of adopting the defendant’s understanding 
of the “clear statutory statements of Congressional intent and legislative 
history undermining this expansive reading of Section 1589.”48  And GEO 
faulted Judge Kane for not defending his choice of the plain-text canon of 
statutory construction.49 
The first part of the defendant’s argument in the motion to reconsider 
was divided into two parts, the first of which argued that Judge Kane’s 
interpretation of the TVPA violated the “absurdity” doctrine,50 and the 
second of which argued that a “civic duty exception” should be read into 
the text of the TVPA.51  GEO also argued that Judge Kane was wrong to 
place the burden of proving the applicability of a “civic duty exception” 
on the defendant, claiming that the plaintiffs should have to bear the 
burden of demonstrating why the exception did not apply.52  The 
defendant concluded the first part of its argument by complaining that 
Judge Kane’s refusal to throw out the charges against them amounted to 
the creation of a new statutory cause of action for damages to be brought 
by detainees against private detention facilities.53 
                                                
45 Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Geo Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 
2, Menocal v. Geo Group, Inc., No. 14-CV-02887-JLK (Aug. 4, 2015). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 6–9. 
48 Id. at 6. 
49 Id. at 6–9. 
50 Id. at 10. 
51 Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Geo Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 
17–20, Menocal, No. 14-CV-02887-JLK. 
52 Id. at 20 (“in determining whether federal statute created an enforceable right under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff bore burden to show that judicially-made exceptions did not apply”).  
See, e.g., Lochman v. County of Charlevoix, 94 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that to 
determine whether federal statute created an enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
plaintiff bears the burden to show that judicially-made exceptions do not apply). 
53 Id. at 23. 
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GEO’s second argument against the judge’s order alleged an 
inconsistency between the judge’s finding that the individuals detained 
were not employees under Colorado law, on the one hand, with his 
finding that GEO may have been unjustly enriched, on the other.54  GEO 
argued that, since the detainees had no subjective reasonable expectations 
of minimum wage protections, they were therefore not entitled to expect 
compensation under the SCA.55 
B. Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion For Reconsideration, Document 31, 
filed 8/4/2015 
In responding to the defendant’s “Motion to Reconsider,” the 
plaintiffs argued that they were not legally compelled to respond to the 
argument point by point, since the defendant’s motion was procedurally 
improper and brought without reference to any federal rule allowing such 
a motion under the circumstances.56  The plaintiffs also indicated that the 
defendant waived any arguments that were not brought in its prior 
Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) 
12(g)(2), and that, as a result, GEO could not initiate new legal arguments 
in the Motion to Reconsider.57  While a motion to reconsider may be 
permissible in cases where the law has suddenly shifted or where new 
facts have come to light, the plaintiffs claimed that the only change in 
circumstances that took place between the defendant’s initial Motion to 
Dismiss and the subsequent Motion to Reconsider is that GEO hired new 
lawyers, who felt trapped by the failure of their predecessors to raise 
certain arguments in the initial motion and who simply wanted another, 
improper “bite at the apple.”58 
C. Order Denying GEO’s Motion to Reconsider, Document 33, filed 9/22/2015 
Judge Kane, in the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider, 
pointed out that the defendant provided no evidence of any change in law 
or new evidence, which might have served as the legal basis to grant a 
                                                
54 Id. at 25. 
55 Id. 
56 See Mot. to Strike Def’s. Mot. for Recons. of Order Den. GEO Group, Inc.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss at 2, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp.3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-
02887-JLK). 
57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) (“a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make 
another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party 
but omitted from its earlier motion.”). 
58 See Mot. to Strike Def’s. Mot. for Recons. of Order Den. GEO Group, Inc.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss at 2, Menocal, 113 F. Supp.3d 1125 (No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK). 
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motion to reconsider.59  Indeed, as the court noted, the defendant’s motion 
emphasized that the interpretation of the TVPA at issue in the case “is an 
issue of ‘first impression,’” which is to say, clearly not an area where a 
recent doctrinal shift has occurred.60  Judge Kane also noted that GEO 
impermissibly introduced a new argument against the unjust-enrichment 
finding, which had already been waived by counsel’s failure to bring the 
argument in its previous Motion to Dismiss, as outlined in Fed. R. Civ. 
P.12(h)(1).61 
D. Motion for Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) And Appointment of 
Class Counsel  Under Rule 23(g), Document 49, filed 6/6/2015 
The motion noted that the charges Judge Kane had allowed to proceed 
(the TVPA and unjust-enrichment claims) applied to practices through the 
“entire facility” that used “only one non-detainee janitor on the payroll.”62  
In the motion, counsel for the class of Aurora-facility detainees who 
brought suit argued “[t]hey are GEO’s captive workforce.”63 
The Motion for Class Certification referenced information obtained 
during discovery.64  The motion noted that GEO’s policy of requiring 
“comprehensive cleaning of this cell and common space . . . falls outside 
of ICE’s Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), 
which limits the scope of uncompensated detainee housekeeping.”65  This 
motion also reported that this policy has applied to an estimated fifty to 
sixty thousand detainees based on GEO’s own records.66  The motion 
indicated that the “Detainee Handbook Local Supplement . . . informs 
detainees that failure to perform housing unit sanitation work is a 300-
level ‘High Moderate’ disciplinary offense, which could subject detainees 
to up to 72 hours in disciplinary segregation (also known as solitary 
confinement) or even to criminal prosecution.”67 
                                                
59 Order on Mot. for Reconsideration at 2, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp.3d 
1125 (D. Colo. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK). 
60 Id. at 2 (citing defendant’s Motion to Reconsider). 
61 See id. (stating that the unjust enrichment claim is dismissed because it was not 
anticipated). 
62 See Motion for Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) and Appointment of Class 
Counsel Under Rule 23(g) at 3, Menocal v. Geo Grp, Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258 (D. Colo. 2017) (No. 
1:14-cv-02887-JLK) (expressing that the detainee workers, now plaintiffs, were subjected to 
forced labor and only one worker was on the payroll). 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 2 (articulating that during the discovery process the defendant’s counsel failed 
to make certain documents confidential that should have been confidential because it was 
mandated by the protective order). 
65 Id. at 4. 
66 Id. at 6. 
67 Id. 
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In addition to the forced-work policy, plaintiffs also highlighted the 
commonalities among those GEO paid one dollar a day through the 
“Voluntary Work Program.”68  The complaint pointed out that “[a]ll 
participants received uniform job descriptions, common to all participants 
in their job class,” and “executed a standardized Detainee Voluntary Work 
Program Agreement.”69  The crux of the charge was that “GEO misled 
VWP participants regarding the possibility that they could negotiate for 
higher wages.” 70  It informed the detainees that  
“[t]he pricing is approved by ICE. GEO does not set the 
pricing. ICE tells us what the daily pay is . . . .” [However, 
t]hese representations [are] false. In reality, the PBNDS 
ICE publishes sets a floor, rather than a ceiling, and 
requires only that “[t]he compensation is at least $1.00 
(USD) per day.”71 
After tying the features of the program to the legal standards 
established for class certification, the Motion for Class Certification noted 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) and requested that the judge appoint the current 
plaintiffs’ counsel as attorneys for the class: “[c]ollectively they have 
invested significant time in identifying and investigating potential claims 
in this action . . . [m]oreover, the varied litigation experience of the team 
will be beneficial to the classes’ pursuit of the claims here.”72 
E. Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification, Document 51, filed 
6/1/2016.  
GEO’s brief scoffed at what it characterized as plaintiffs’ “inventing a 
so-called ‘Forced Labor Policy,’ gratuitously invoking images of the 
‘master’s whip,’ ‘slave-like conditions,’ and a ‘captive workforce’ that is 
‘expolit[ed], conscripted, coerced, and under paid.’”73  The motion 
repeated prior claims that the case lacked precedent for class 
                                                
68 See Motion for Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) and Appointment of Class 
Counsel Under Rule 23(g) at 4, Menocal, 320 F.R.D. 258 (No: 1:14-cv-02887-JLK) (comparing 
the one-dollar-per-day pay that the Volunteer Work Program participants receive with the 
lack of pay that GEO gives its detainees). 
69 Id. at 8. 
70 Id. at 9. 
71 See id. (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 24. 
73 Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification at 9, Menocal v. GEO Corp., 
No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D. Colo. June 6, 2016). 
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certification.74  Much of the defendant’s motion reviewed the lawfulness 
of the program and did not speak directly to the plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Class Certification by explaining why, having been availed of a remedy if 
plaintiffs could prove two charges, the attorneys should not also be able 
to represent a broader class that was allegedly subjected to similar 
violations.75  For instance, the first heading of GEO’s motion stated, “The 
Requirement That Detainees Perform Housekeeping Chores Is Lawful” 
and the second heading stated, “The $1.00 Per Day Allowance Under the 
Federally-Authorized VWP Is Lawful.”76 
The defendant claimed that plaintiffs did not meet the “numerosity” 
requirement because they had not proven there were more than forty 
members who were putative class members.77  The defendants argued that 
the “commonality” criterion was not met because GEO listed a number of 
other sanctions alternative to solitary confinement, but then made the 
“implausible assumption that each and every putative class member 
(assuming each detainee reviewed his or her ICE Aurora Handbook), 
reached the conclusion that ‘[r]efusal to clean [their] assigned living area,’ 
will be penalized by ‘[d]isciplinary segregation’ in a manner that violates 
Section 1589.”78 
GEO similarly claimed that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to 
have a class certified for the charge of unjust enrichment because they 
provided no “basis for how to assess whether this purported 
misrepresentation led to an unjust benefit retained by GEO [in] any 
particular instance.”79 
In refuting the third prong necessary for class certification, 
“typicality,” the defendant asserted that only one of the named plaintiffs 
had submitted a declaration affirming that he had asked for higher pay or 
that GEO was prevented from paying him more due to ICE instructions.80 
                                                
74 See id. at 16 (detailing the four elements to meet class certifications:  (1) the class must 
be large; (2) question of law is similar for the whole class; (3) claims and defenses are the 
same; and (4) representatives of the class will protect the interests of the entire class). 
75 See id. at 15 (showing that the motion discusses Rule 23’s requirements and furthers the 
elements of this rule). 
76 Id. at 3, 7. 
77 See id. at 18 (purporting to show that the plaintiffs did not put forth evidence to prove 
that the numerosity requirement had been satisfied). 
78 Id. at 21. 
79 Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification at 25, Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-
02887-JLK (D. Colo. June 6, 2016). 
80 Id. at 29–30. 
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F. Order Granting Motion For Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)and 
Appointment of Class Counsel Under Rule 23(g), Document 49, filed 
02/27/2017 
Judge Kane granted the Motion for Class Certification.81  The order 
stated that a class would be appropriate even though the issues in the case 
are new and complex.82  Judge Kane set forth his standard for class 
certification as one that “requires predominance of questions of law or fact 
common to the class and superiority of the class action method.”83  He thus 
noted that GEO’s “most compelling, but ultimately unconvincing, 
argument was that elements of both claims necessitate inquiries specific 
to each class member.”84  Kane distinguished the GEO case from Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, a precedent that appeared frequently in the 
defendant’s motion.85  The Wal-Mart case depended on finding that 
supervisors nationwide were all discriminating against female employees 
in a similar fashion. 86  Judge Kane’s order stated that: 
Unlike in Wal-Mart, GEO has a specific, uniformly 
applicable Sanitation Policy that is the subject of 
Representatives’ TVPA claim. This Policy is the glue that 
holds the allegations of the Representatives and putative 
class members together . . . creating a number of crucial 
questions with common answers. For example: Does 
GEO employ a Sanitation Policy that constitutes 
improper means of coercion under the forced labor 
statute?87 
Judge Kane rejected GEO’s point that “no Representative was actually 
disciplined with segregation” by pointing out that “the forced labor 
statute includes threats, schemes, plans, and patterns as improper means 
of coercion.”88  Kane also rejects plaintiffs’ proposal to substitute “a 
                                                
81 See Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3); Appointment of 
Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 1, Menocal v. GEO Corp., No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D.Colo. 
Feb. 27, 2017) (granting the motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel). 
82 Id. at 2. 
83 Id. at 5. 
84 Id. at 6. 
85 See id. at 8–9 (distinguishing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) from 
the current litigation). 
86 See Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3); Appointment of 
Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 8, Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (discussing the 
reasoning the Supreme Court set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. when analyzing whether 
female employees seeking management positions were discriminated against). 
87 Id. (footnote omitted). 
88 Id. at 9. 
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reasonable person standard” for specific findings of subjective fear 
inducing compliance with the guards’ orders in all cases.89  Instead, he 
found that:  
the ‘by means of’ element can be satisfied by inferring 
from classwide proof that the putative class members 
labored because of GEO’s improper means of coercion. 
Representatives are correct that there is nothing 
preventing such an inference. I have not found and GEO 
has not provided any authority requiring that, for TVPA 
claims, causation must be proven by direct and not 
circumstantial evidence. Where a jury decided the 
individual merits of Representatives claims, it surely 
would be permitted to make such an inference.90 
In other words, the plaintiffs only needed to prove that GEO used 
impermissible threats to induce labor, not that any particular detainee 
acted on the basis of these threats.91 
Kane rejected GEO’s claim that the damages differed among putative 
class members, pointing out that as long as the mechanism producing the 
damages was similar across members, it would be possible to assess the 
damages separately once GEO was found liable.92 
Perhaps Judge Kane’s most important defense of the decision to 
certify the class was his policy analysis finding that class action lawsuits 
are designed to support the weak in their efforts to challenge those with 
more money and power: 
In including Rule 23(b)(3), ‘the Advisory Committee had 
dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups 
of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’ . . .  In 
this case, the putative class members reside in countries 
around the world, lack English proficiency, and have 
little knowledge of the legal system in the United States. 
                                                
89 Id. at 10. 
90 Id. at 13. 
91 See id. (explaining that plaintiffs must only show that GEO used impermissible threats, 
not that any detainee actually acted in response to the threats). 
92 Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3); Appointment of 
Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 14, Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK. 
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It is unlikely that they would individually bring these 
innovative claims against GEO.93 
Turning to the unjust enrichment claims, Judge Kane again explained 
his legal finding of commonality hung on whether GEO’s 
“misrepresentation contributes to the context of GEO’s enrichment,” and 
not on the subjective impressions among those who agree to work for one 
dollar per day.94  He also rejected that the “unjust” element of GEO’s 
enrichment requires individual-level determinations.95  Judge Kane found 
that “GEO ‘has failed to explain why it would be equitable for it to retain 
[the benefit conferred by] some of the putative class members, but 
inequitable to retain [the benefit] from others.’”96  Judge Kane then 
distinguished the facts in the GEO case from those in the precedent GEO 
cited, stating that, in unjust enrichment claims, “common question will 
rarely, if ever, predominate.”97  Kane pointed out that Friedman addressed 
whether each employee in 2.58 million personal unscripted transactions 
behaved in a similar fashion.98  “Here, there is a consistent policy under 
which detained individuals worked and were paid the same amount.”99  
Kane’s order concluded by appointing as counsel to the class the attorneys 
representing the nine plaintiffs.100  “Representatives’ counsel . . . have 
uniquely relevant experience with the client base and with bringing 
complex claims against detention facilities.”101 
G. The GEO Group, Inc.’s Petition for Permission to Appeal Class, Appellate 
Case: 17:701, #01019778492, filed 03/13/2017 
The motion emphasized the “two novel theories” in the case:  
(1) Does a contractor operating a detention facility for the 
federal government compel ‘forced labor’ in violation of 
a federal human trafficking statute by requiring detainees 
to periodically perform housekeeping chores, when the 
contractor and its housekeeping policies are subject to 
                                                
93 Id. at 15 (internal citation omitted). 
94 Id. at 17. 
95 Id. at 17–18 (discussing why the element of “unjust” should not be subject to individual 
determinations of fact). 
96 Id. at 18. 
97 See id. (citing Freidman v. Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 601 (D. 
Colo. 2015)). 
98 Id. (noting the problem with trying to use individual determinations to resolve the 
problems of a large class of persons). 
99 Id. at 19. 
100 Id. at 20–21. 
101 Id. at 20. 
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extensive federal contractual and regulatory 
requirements as well as direct federal supervision, and 
the housekeeping policy is both longstanding and 
judicially-accepted?; 
and  
(2) Is the contractor ‘unjustly enriched,’ and required to 
pay restitution for the detainees’ participation in a 
federally-created, sponsored and supervised voluntary 
work program, when the settled expectation for decades 
has been that participants are provided a daily allowance 
of $1?102 
GEO went on to acknowledge that the district court rejected GEO’s 
request for an interlocutory appeal.103  Nonetheless, the two questions 
GEO put before the appellate court were not questions about the adequacy 
of the class, but objections that went to the merits of the legal charges 
themselves.104 
GEO objected to the judge’s order certifying the class because: 
Unjust enrichment claims under Colorado law turn on the 
“reasonable expectations” of the parties . . . The district 
court failed to require any evidence that a single 
detainee—much less a class—reasonably expected to 
receive more than the $1 daily VWP allowance. [GEO 
pled for review by noting that the] “class action lawsuit 
for monetary relief . . . puts GEO in an acutely 
problematic and intolerable position of carrying out 
federal government directives while facing potentially 
massive financial harm for doing so.105 
The arguments here tracked those in their original motion to deny class 
certification.106  GEO asserted that “the novel and indeterminate nature of 
the Plaintiffs’ claims creates an insurmountable barrier to class 
                                                
102 Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 1, Menocal v. GEO Grp., (D. Colo. 
2017) (No. 01019778492). 
103 Id. at 2. 
104 See id. at 2–3 (analyzing whether the charges levied in this case were reasonable). 
105 Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 3–4, Menocal, (D. Colo. 2017) (No. 
01019778492). 
106 See Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, Menocal v. GEO Corp., 
No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D. Colo. June 6, 2016). 
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certification.”107  GEO repeatedly emphasized that the novelty of the 
claims and the allegation that Congress did not intend to prohibit their use 
of detainee labor in the fashion plaintiffs alleged means that the appellate 
court should deny certification.108  GEO again cited precedents requiring 
a purposive interpretation of law and not a plain reading of the text.109  
The appellee brief asserted that the plaintiffs’ use of a human-trafficking 
statute to seek damages for janitorial tasks “renders the TVPA absurd and 
makes certification of a class based on it impossible.”110 
Engaging with the text of Judge Kane’s order, the appellees 
challenged the standard he used to infer the causal link between the 
conditions of their custody and the likelihood they would: 
work for reasons other than GEO’s improper means of 
coercion. . . . Rather than demanding proof that the 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation . . . the district court 
posited an unsupported social-psychological profile of 
the ‘climate’ of detention. . . .111 
The brief challenged the unjust enrichment charge for the same reasons as 
previously laid out.112  The specific attack on Judge Kane’s order 
emphasized the variation in their conditions and asserted that the court 
should have demanded that the plaintiffs provide a damages model.113 
                                                
107 Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 9, Menocal v. GEO Grp., (D. Colo. 
2017) (No. 01019778492) (citing Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th 
Cir.2008).  
108 See id. at 11 (presenting an explanation as to why the appellate court should deny 
certification). 
109 See id. at 10–11 (examining why a purposive reading of the text should be used rather 
than looking at the plain meaning). See also United States v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 
310 U.S. 534, 553 (1940) (holding that the commission has no jurisdiction to regulate the 
qualifications or hours of service of others); Rector, etc., of Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457, 517 (1892) (stating that the language within the statute did not reflect the 
legislative intent of the act); United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(resembling a similar holding to the cases discussed above); In re Busetta, 314 B.R. 218, 227–
28 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Holy Trinity’s doctrine). 
110 Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 13, Menocal, (D. Colo. 2017) (No. 
01019778492). 
111 Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted). 
112 See id. at 19–20 (explaining how the unjust enrichment charge was attacked). See also 
Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 269 (D. Colo. 2017) (furthering GEO’s argument 
related to the classification of the representatives). 
113 Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 22, Menocal, (D. Colo. 2017) (No. 
01019778492). 
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The brief concluded with policy arguments tied to whether GEO 
would be forced to “‘resolve the case based on considerations 
independent of the merits,’ such as by settlement.”114  GEO stated:  
[T]he district court’s novel certification of a class 
comprising all people detained at the Facility over the 
past ten years poses a potentially catastrophic risk to 
GEO’s ability to honor its contracts with the federal 
government . . . .  And the skeleton of this suit could 
potentially be refiled against privately operated facilities 
across the United States, causing GEO and other 
contractors to defend them even though GEO firmly 
believes that policies give the Plaintiffs no legal claim.115 
H. Grant of Petitioner’s Appeal, #01019793218, filed 04/11//2017 
On April 11, 2017, the court granted the petitioner’s appeal: “Upon 
consideration of the Petition, the response, the reply, and the materials on 
file, we note both the complexity and difficulty of the issues presented, 
and we grant the Petition.”116 
I. Appellees/Plaintiffs Reply Brief, Case 17-1125, Doc 01019851249, filed 
08/04/2017. 
The appellees’ reply brief repeated the arguments on which plaintiffs 
relied in the district court case. It also provided specific examples of forced 
labor.117  For instance, the motion stated: 
During his detention, Valerga performed work cleaning 
the private and common living areas, when selected for 
the cleaning crew by the guards, for no pay because ‘it 
was well known that those who refused to do that work 
for free were put in ‘the hole’—or solitary 
confinement.’. . .  A guard once threatened Valerga with 
being put in the hole when he protested cleaning for 
free . . . .  Valerga also worked under the VWP from 
approximately October 2013 to June 2014, both working 
                                                
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). 
116 The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal, No. 17-701 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2017) (order granting 
petition for permission to appeal class certification). 
117 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8–11, Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-1125 
(10th Cir. Sept. 27, 2017) (providing various examples of the plaintiffs’ experiences with 
forced labor). 
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in the kitchen and stripping and waxing floors for 7–8 
hours per day, five days per week. . . .  Valerga received 
$1 per day under the VWP regardless of the hours he 
worked.118 
The appellees noted the deference the 10th Circuit affords district court 
judges in granting certification:  “Recognizing the considerable discretion 
the district court enjoys in this area,” the Court “defer[s] to the district 
court’s certification if it applies the proper Rule 23 standard and its 
‘decision falls within the bounds of rationally available choices given the 
facts and law involved in the matter at hand.’”119 
The brief also challenged GEO’s “backdoor attack on the merits and 
purported novelty of plaintiffs’ claims.”120  The plaintiffs argued that, 
although they believed they would win at trial, this question is not the 
appropriate inquiry during the appeal.121 
In response to the argument that the invocation of TVPA is more 
broad than Congress intended, the appellees cited United States v. 
Kaufman, which held that the TVPA’s protections are broad enough “to 
combat severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise to the level of 
involuntary servitude.”122  The motion noted that GEO’s arguments 
against class certification hang on fact-based allegations that require 
review by a jury: 
By asserting that ‘no detainee was likely to have a 
reasonable expectation of an allowance in excess of the 
$1.00 daily amount’ . . . GEO identifies another issue 
susceptible to class-wide proof: whether Plaintiffs must 
prove that they had a reasonable expectation of receiving 
in excess of $1 per day to prevail on this claim.123 
The brief explored Kozminski at length and quoted from Justice Brennan’s 
concurring opinion: 
It is of course not easy to articulate when a person’s 
actions are ‘involuntary.’ In some minimalist sense the 
laborer always has a choice no matter what the threat: the 
laborer can choose to work, or take a beating; work, or go 
                                                
118 Id. at 10–11. 
119 Id. at 17–18. 
120 Id. at 19. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 22 (citing 546 F.3d 1242, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
123 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 24, Menocal, No. 17-1125. 
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to jail. We can all agree that these choices are so 
illegitimate that any decision to work is ‘involuntary.’124 
To GEO’s objection that class certification is inappropriate for ascertaining 
alleged subjective fears—each individual might respond differently—the 
appellees noted how circumstantial evidence could be used:  
An individual detainee could rely on circumstantial 
evidence, including GEO’s clearly stated policies 
containing threats of discipline, to persuade a jury that 
she labored because of the threat of what would happen 
to her if she did not. She would not need to provide direct 
and individualized evidence of her mental state.125 
The appellees rejected the objection to the difficulty of assessing 
classwide damages and referenced a number of precedents and models 
for calculating these.126  The appellees also rejected the argument that the 
unjust-enrichment claims could not be pursued on a classwide basis by 
distinguishing the precedents involving a range of individualized 
business transactions with GEO’s single policy applied across the facility: 
“[t]he VWP was a uniform policy whose terms were non-negotiable.”127  
The brief concluded by refuting the relevance of the Alvarado Guevara case 
GEO cited: “[t]hat case involved Fair Labor Standards Act and 
constitutional claims against a purported government employer, and 
therefore did not address the applicability of Colorado’s unjust 
enrichment law to detainee labor for a private company, or the superiority 
of the class action mechanism to adjudicate the same.”128 
J. Reply Brief for Appellant, filed 09/01/2017 
The Reply offered a table with direct quotations from Judge Kane’s 
order justifying the generalizability of the claims on the left column and 
GEO’s empirical allegations refuting these on the right, for example: 
uniformly applicable Sanitation Policy . . . is the glue that 
holds the allegations . . . together. There is no single, 
uniformly applied ‘Sanitation Policy’ that threatens 
detainees with serious harm for failing to help clean. 
                                                
124 Id. at 33 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 959 (1988)). 
125 Id. at 36. 
126 See id. at 41–42 (supporting the notion that assessing classwide damages can be 
determined through various methods). 
127 Id. at 50. 
128 Id. at 52, n.12. 
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There is a housekeeping policy, and there is a flexible 
discipline policy administered in various ways.129 
GEO also noted that the threats to induce work vary and not all are 
coercive: “Even if, as Plaintiffs have claimed, the ‘choice between solitary 
confinement and work is no choice at all,’ surely the choice between losing 
movie privileges and work is a choice.”130  GEO also argued that the 
plaintiffs did not provide specific statements from GEO guards that would 
induce those in GEO’s custody to believe their labor was being coerced:  
These claims, even if true, provide no basis for a classwide 
inference that GEO coerced the labor of every, or even 
most of the detainees who have been housed at the 
Facility over the past decade. Who told Plaintiffs they 
would be sent to “the hole”? Were the speakers GEO 
officers or other detainees?131 
VI. SYLVESTER OWINO AND JONATHAN GOMEZ ET AL. V. CORECIVIC, CASE NO. 
3:17-CV-01112-JLS-NLS 
A. Complaint, Document 1, filed 05/31/2017 
Sylvester Owino and Jonathan Gomez are plaintiffs for a class action 
lawsuit against CoreCivic (formerly “Corrections Corporation of 
America” or CCA).132  Some of the Owino allegations tracked those in the 
Menocal lawsuit.133  Others were specific to claims viable under California 
law.134  Of special note is that the class was not just those held in CCA’s 
Otay Mesa facility, which held the named plaintiffs, but two much larger 
classes: (1) all those who had been in CCA’s custody under immigration 
laws since November 2, 2004, and forced to work; and (2) all those in 
California who had been in CCA’s custody since November 2, 2004, and 
forced to work.135  Whereas the Menocal suit stated three causes of action, 
                                                
129 Reply Brief for Appellant at 6–8, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-1125 (10th Cir. 
Sept. 1, 2017). 
130 Id. at 14. 
131 Id. at 19. 
132 See Complaint at 1, Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal. May 31, 
2017) (stating the parties to the action: Owino and others of that class, and CoreCivic). 
133 Compare id. 1–2, 22 (showing the similar causes of action, including human trafficking 
and minimum wage laws) with Motion for Class Certification of Petitioner at 1, Menocal v. 
Geo Group, No.14-cv-02887-JLK (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2017) (indicating the same causes of action 
for trafficking and wage laws). 
134 See Complaint at 9, 28, Owino, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (noting the causes of action 
that fall specifically under California law). 
135 See id. at 9 (defining the forced labor class under federal law). 
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Owino alleged twelve.136  The specific causes of action cited were: the 
TVPA; the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act; California’s 
Unfair Competition Law; Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; Failure to Pay 
Overtime Wages; Failure to Provide Mandated Meal Periods; Failure to 
Provide Mandated Rest Periods; Failure to Furnish Timely and Accurate 
Wage Statements; Failure to Pay Compensation Upon 
Termination/Waiting Time Penalties; Imposition of Unlawful Terms and 
Conditions of Employment; Negligence; Unjust Enrichment.137 
The Complaint referenced CCA’s policies, but provided no specific 
examples of actions by CCA in violation of the laws cited.138  In addition 
to seeking damages, the plaintiffs were also seeking to enjoin CCA from 
continuing its illegal practices, including using forced labor by “coercing 
Plaintiffs and the Class Members to perform labor and services under 
threat of confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained 
restriction, and solitary confinement.”139 
B. Motion to Dismiss, Document 18, filed 08/11/2017 
In addition to legal analysis tracking that of GEO’s motions to dismiss 
the Menocal suit, CCA also argued that “the facts plaintiffs allege are 
insufficient to support a claim.”140  The defendant added that a California 
law cannot be used to challenge programs connected to immigration 
policy, which is “exclusively a federal function.”141  CCA also claimed that 
                                                
136 Compare Motion for Class Certification of Petitioner at 1, Menocal, No.14-cv-02887-JLK 
(discussing the three causes of action in the Menocal case) with Complaint at 12–32, Owino, 
No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (presenting the twelve causes of action brought in the Owino 
case). 
137 See Complaint at 13, Owino, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (noting the first cause of action, 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act); id. at 16 (the second cause of action is the Trafficking 
of Victims Protection Act under California law); id. at 21 (the third cause of action is Violation 
of California’s Unfair Competition Law); id. at 22 (the fourth cause of action is Failure to Pay 
Minimum Wage); id. at 23 (the fifth cause of action is Failure to Pay Overtime Wages); id. at 
24 (the sixth cause of action is the failure to provide mandated meal periods); id. at 25 (the 
seventh cause of action requires CoreCivic to give rest periods); id.( the eighth cause of action 
is the requirement to furnish wages); id. at 27 (the ninth cause of action is based on the Failure 
to Pay Compensation Upon Termination/Waiting Time Penalties); id. at 28 (the tenth cause 
of action bars imposing unlawful conditions on employees); id. (the eleventh cause of action 
is for negligence on behalf of plaintiffs individually and as a class); id. at 32 (the twelfth cause 
of action is for unjust enrichment). 
138 See, e.g., id. at 13 (complaining that the policies of CoreCivic harmed employees, but 
failing to list or explain any specific policies enacted by CoreCivic). 
139 Id. at 19. 
140 Motion to Dismiss for Respondent at 10, Owino, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS. 
141 Id. at 13. 
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immigration detainees do not qualify as “employees” under the labor laws 
of California.142 
C. Response to Motion to Dismiss, Document 22, 08/31/2017 
The motion stated that its references to CCA’s policies are adequate to 
meet the standards of Iqbal and Twombly, and also provided a lengthy 
refutation of CCA’s defense based on Alvarado Guevara, in particular 
noting that the case rested on an appropriations bill from 1978 and that 
the ceiling of one dollar per day does not appear in the authorizing statute 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d):  
If the shoe were on the other foot, if Congress limited the 
alien allowance portion of the $266,450,000 appropriation 
to $500 per day, would it be a reasonable interpretation 
that Defendant is required to pay that much? Hardly. 
What it would mean is that out of the $266M 
appropriation, not more than $500 per day could be 
allocated for an alien’s allowance.143 
D. Order by Judge Janis Sammartino, Document 25, filed 09/07/2017 
On her own motion, Judge Sammartino ordered she would rule on the 
motions without oral argument.144 
VII.  STATE OF WASHINGTON V. THE GEO GROUP, INC. 
On September 20, 2017, the Attorney General, on behalf of the State of 
Washington, sued GEO in Washington State’s Superior Court for Pierce 
County.145  This was the first lawsuit alleging unjust enrichment and 
minimum-wage law violations brought by a state government against a 
                                                
142 Id. at 17. 
143 Response to Motion to Dismiss for Petitioner at 2, Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 3:17-cv-
01112-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal. August 31, 2017) (stating the Twombly and Iqbal standard that 
complaints must be facially plausible); id. at 23 (discussing the significance of 8 U.S.C. § 
1555(d) in relation to the defendant’s argument). 
144 See Order Vacating Hearing at 1, Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS) 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017), EFC No. 18 (noting that the court decided on the matter without the 
necessary oral arguments). 
145 See Complaint at 1, State of Wash. v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-2-11422-2 (P.C. Wash. 
Sept. 20, 2017). See also AG Ferguson Sues Operator of the Northwest Detention Center for Wage 
Violations, WASH. ST. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.atg.wa.gov/news 
/news-releases/ag-ferguson-sues-operator-northwest-detention-center-wage-violations 
[https://perma.cc/3JH4-2FGK] (stating that on September 20, 2017, the Attorney General 
for the state of Washington sued GEO Group because GEO Group deprived their workers 
the appropriate wage for their services). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/4
2018] One Dollar Per Day 367 
private prison firm.146  The six-page complaint began by highlighting the 
“[d]efendant’s longstanding failure to adequately pay immigration 
detainees for their work at the privately owned and operated Northwest 
Detention Center (NWDC).”147 
The complaint alleged that GEO is an “employer” and the detainees 
are “employees” under the minimum-wage laws of Washington.148  It 
further alleged that GEO has garnered the benefits of paying sub-
minimum wages to its captive workers to perform necessary tasks since 
2005.149 
The first charge the plaintiff alleged referenced Washington’s 
minimum wage law: 
RCW 49.46.020 requires every employer to pay the hourly 
minimum wage “to 6 each of his or her employees” who 
is covered by Washington’s minimum wage laws. 
Detainees work for Defendant and perform many of the 
functions necessary to keep NWDC operational including 
preparing and serving food to detainees, cleaning 
common areas, and operating the laundry.150 
For the charge of unjust enrichment, the complaint states:  “Defendant 
benefits by retaining the difference between the $1 per day that it pays 
detainees and the fair wage that it should pay for work performed at 
NWDC.”151  It is unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit gained from 
its practice of failing to pay adequate compensation to detainees for the 
work they perform at NWDC.152  The complaint sought to have the court 
find that the detainees are “employees” and GEO at the Northwest 
Detention Center an “employer” under Washington law, and to declare 
that the NWDC must comply with the state’s minimum wage law and 
“disgorge the amounts it has been unjustly enriched.”153 
                                                
146 See AG Ferguson Sues Operator of the Northwest Detention Center for Wage Violations, supra 
note 145 (discussing how the lawsuit, whose claims assert that GEO Group violated the state 
of Washington’s minimum wage laws and unjustly enriched the corporation, is unique in 
the sense that it was brought to the court by an Attorney General). 
147 Complaint at 1, The GEO Group, Inc. (No. 17-2-11422-2). 
148 Id. at 4. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 5. 
151 Id. 
152 See id. (stating that it is unfair for the GEO corporation to financially benefit from work 
performed by NWDC inmates). 
153 See id. at 6 (arguing that the corporation should be subject to the state’s minimum wage 
laws because it is an employer and the prisoners are technically employees). 
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VIII.  CHAO CHEN V. THE GEO GROUP, INC. 
On September 26, 2017, Chao Chen was named as the lead plaintiff in 
a class-action lawsuit also against GEO’s NWDC.154  The lawsuit alleged 
only violations of Colorado’s Minimum Wage Order and did not allege 
unjust enrichment.155  GEO’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 9, 2017 
claimed, among other arguments, that Washington’s minimum wage law 
was preempted by federal immigration policy.156  GEO argued that a 
“detainee” status under immigration law preempted claims based on an 
employer-employee relationship.  The motion also cited Alvarado and 
drew upon the reasoning in the Menocal case, dismissing the claims made 
based on the Colorado MWO.157  On December 6, 2017, Judge Bryan 
denied GEO’s motion and, for the first time greenlighted the claims based 
on minimum-wage violations.158  His order characterized GEO’s motion 
as a “hodgepodge of federal statutes” and declined to follow the FLSA 
analysis in Alvarado, Whyte, and Menocal:  “[I]n this Court’s view, 
extending the logic of Alvarado to interpret this State’s statutory exception 
to include federal detainees moves beyond interpretation to 
legislation.”159  Remarkably, GEO filed not only an answer, but also 
counterclaims against Chao Chen charging him with unjust enrichment in 
an amount exceeding $75,000.160  The points in support of the 
counterclaims recite the elements of the GEO work program and state that 
“GEO provides basic necessities to all detainees,” with no explanation as 
to why that obligates Chao Chen to pay GEO.161 
IX. RAUL NOVOA ET AL. V. THE GEO GROUP, INC., CASE NO: 5:17-CV-02514 
Raul Novoa, a detainee at the Adelanto facility in California, filed a 
complaint against GEO on December 20, 2017, on behalf of himself and 
                                                
154 See Class Action Complaint for Damages at 1, Chao Chen v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 
3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2017) (designating Mr. Chen as the lead plaintiff in the 
class-action lawsuit). 
155 See id. (stating that the class-action lawsuit focuses on violations of the state’s minimum 
wage act as opposed to the corporation unjustly enriching itself through the prisoners’ labor). 
156  See GEO’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint for Damages, Chao Chen v. The 
GEO Group, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2017).  
157  Id. at 25–26. 
158  See Order on Defendant The GEO Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action 
Complaint for Damages, Chao Chen v. the GEO Group, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. 
Dec. 6, 2017). 
159  Id. at p. 14. 
160 See GEO’s Answer and Counterclaims, Chao Chen v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 3:17-
cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2017) at p. 8. 
161 Id. at 8–9. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/4
2018] One Dollar Per Day 369 
others in his class.162  The lawsuit points out that an immigrant rights 
group called Adelanto the “‘deadliest detention center’” and that GEO 
withholds “sufficient food, water, and hygiene products” to force 
detainees to work so that they may purchase these necessary items from 
GEO.163  Novoa, a legal permanent resident who earns $15.65/hour as a 
construction worker and has lived in Los Angeles since age four, has been 
released from Adelanto since 2015.164  The lawsuit is demanding not only 
damages for violating California’s minimum wage law, unjust enrichment 
under California common law, California’s unfair competition law, 
California’s Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and the federal statute 
prohibiting attempted forced labor (18 U.S.C. § 1594(a)) but also injunctive 
relief for the latter.165 
X.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to summarize key legal strategies being 
used in new class-action litigation on behalf of those alleged to be non-
citizens—the putative classes also include U.S. citizens—and who perform 
work for private prison firms while in their custody for de minimis or no 
pay.166  However, this research prompted me to notice a discrepancy 
between GEO’s claims about the impact of the litigation on its business in 
its appellate brief and its disclosures to its shareholders that merits 
discussion.167  GEO’s March 13, 2017, petition with the Tenth Circuit made 
the apoplectic assertion that allowing the Aurora class-action lawsuit to 
proceed would jeopardize all of GEO’s ICE contracts: 
[T]he district court’s novel certification of a class 
comprising all people detained at the Facility over the 
past ten years poses a potentially catastrophic risk to GEO’s 
ability to honor its contracts with the federal government. And 
the skeleton of this suit could potentially be refiled 
against privately operated facilities across the United 
States, causing GEO and other contractors to defend them 
                                                
162 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Raul Novoa v. The 
GEO Group, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02514 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017). 
163 Id. at 7. 
164 Id. at 9. 
165 Id. at 12, 14, 15. 
166 See Stevens, supra note 5, at 401–02 (discussing the first class-action lawsuit brought 
against a global prison for failing to pay the federally-mandated wage for employment). 
167 See The GEO Group, Inc.’s Petition for Permission to Appeal Class Certification at 1, 
Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2017) (asking the court to 
look at the district court’s class certification because of the legal issues that arise from the 
ruling). 
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even though GEO firmly believes that policies give the 
Plaintiffs no legal claim.168 
And yet, for the period ending June 30, 2017, the company filed a public 
report with the Security and Exchange Commission representing the 
impact on GEO from the Aurora litigation as benign: 
The plaintiffs seek actual damages, compensatory 
damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages, 
restitution, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other relief 
as the Court may deem proper. The Company intends to 
take all necessary steps to vigorously defend itself and 
has consistently refuted the allegations and claims in the 
lawsuit. The Company has not recorded an accrual relating to 
this matter at this time, as a loss is not considered probable nor 
reasonably estimable at this state of the lawsuit. If the Company 
had to change the level of compensation under the voluntary 
work program, or to substitute employee work for voluntary 
work, this could increase costs of operating these facilities.169 
GEO is telling its shareholders that a loss “could increase costs,” not that 
it would be unable to fill its contracts.170  The two very different scenarios 
portrayed within months means that GEO is misleading either the Tenth 
Circuit or the investing public.171 Furthermore, both of these 
representations are presumably produced by or under the supervision of 
GEO’s Office of General Counsel.172  Insofar as these are both statements 
produced by attorneys representing the firm who are focused on the 
impact of this litigation, it would appear these statements are deliberate.  
If this is the case, GEO could be subject to shareholder lawsuits based on 
                                                
168 Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
169 The GEO Group, Inc., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 to 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q), (June 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/923796/000119312517249967/d423976d10q.htm [https://perma.cc/YA8N-DKHG] 
(emphasis added). 
170 See The GEO Group, Inc.’s Petition for Permission to Appeal Class Certification at 26, 
Menocal v. GEO Grp., No. 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2017) (discussing that the 
company does not expect any litigation to have a negative impact on their financial 
condition). 
171 See id. at 23 (arguing that a class action lawsuit would jeopardize GEO’s contracts and 
contending that a class action lawsuit would not jeopardize GEO’s contracts). 
172 See id. (noting both statements made by GEO attorneys). 
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the misrepresentation of the firm’s financial exposure due to the Menocal 
lawsuits.173 
                                                
173 Cf. id. (stating that the district court’s holding poses a problem for GEO to honor 
contracts); Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo. 2017) (granting GEO’s 
motion to dismiss the Colorado minimum wage claim). 
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